Talk:Gettysburg Campaign: Difference between revisions

From Citizendium
Jump to navigation Jump to search
imported>Hayford Peirce
(→‎Puzzled as to why this is being renamed a campaign: aren't there two distinct things here? both a battle AND a campaign?)
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz
(Battle vs. campaign)
Line 16: Line 16:
::::::As an aside, it seems to me that this discussion has dragged out because Richard has taken a counterintuitive stance and then proceeded to defend it--and, in my humble opinion, weakly.  I see that so far, he has persuaded no one (and several have made extremely strong points in reply).  So, in this case, since the person taking the stand is one of our few active History Editors, and he seems to have made up his mind and wishes to establish his opinion as our policy, I guess it is incumbent upon me to declare that I am overruling him, as Editor-in-Chief.  (Sorry, Richard.)  Generally, I try to give editors the benefit of the doubt, but sometimes I do have to overrule them, which I assure you I never like to do.</blockquote> (End of Larry's quote -- It's hard to format this correctly.)
::::::As an aside, it seems to me that this discussion has dragged out because Richard has taken a counterintuitive stance and then proceeded to defend it--and, in my humble opinion, weakly.  I see that so far, he has persuaded no one (and several have made extremely strong points in reply).  So, in this case, since the person taking the stand is one of our few active History Editors, and he seems to have made up his mind and wishes to establish his opinion as our policy, I guess it is incumbent upon me to declare that I am overruling him, as Editor-in-Chief.  (Sorry, Richard.)  Generally, I try to give editors the benefit of the doubt, but sometimes I do have to overrule them, which I assure you I never like to do.</blockquote> (End of Larry's quote -- It's hard to format this correctly.)
:::::::[[User:Hayford Peirce|Hayford Peirce]] 12:30, 15 June 2008 (CDT)
:::::::[[User:Hayford Peirce|Hayford Peirce]] 12:30, 15 June 2008 (CDT)
==Not daring to follow that number of colons without a colonoscope...==
It would be perfectly appropriate to discuss, as a campaign, Lee's 1863 plans for the Army of Northern Virginia, but neither the lead nor the first section frames the activities in terms of a campaign. Clearly, Stuart failed if his mission were purely screening, which is a common perception. Lee and Stuart may have had an operational level plan for an independent cavalry operation, but these are not brought out. Presumably there would be other forces in a campaign, and, at a strategic level, perhaps pressure in other Confederate departments/theaters.
Some of Lee's thinking does come out in the "Operations" section, although "fantasy" does seem an apt description of Lee's ideas, which sound like a WWII Imperial Japanese Navy plan for a "decisive battle", at which all the barbarians' ships would conveniently sink. I had had the impression that Marse Robert was, if not a teetotaler, abstemious; those fantasies seem more appropriate for one indulging in psychoactive substances not readily available for a century. Given the Confederacy changed its cryptographic key only four times during the Late Unpleasantness Between the States (the term used by the docent at the Museum of the Confederacy in Richmond), the South did not seem overly obsessed with security. Was there no one in the CSA to observe that if that reflected Lee's thinking, a switch to Grant's brand of booze might be appropriate?  I confess here that I have long thought of Lee as a good tactician, an inspirational leader, and a fine human being, but have never been impressed with his operational or strategic brilliance.
Seriously, if the article is to be about a campaign, the material in this section needs to move much nearer the beginning. I agree with Hayford that the average reader is going to be looking for the Three Days.
The maneuvering beforehand was not intended to force a decisive battle at Gettysburg, nor did "rebels, who had entered Gettysburg looking for a warehouse of shoes"--if "the Rebels" implied a major force. In reality, the only reason anything happened there was that a Confederate division commander, Henry Heth, heard that Gettysburg had a storehouse of much-needed shoes, and obtained permission to raid the town in search of those critical transportation resources.
Having spent 40 or so years in the DC area, "Army of Northern Virginia" sounds like massed irritated commuters in SUVs. Meade wouldn't have had a chance. :-)  [[User:Howard C. Berkowitz|Howard C. Berkowitz]] 12:52, 15 June 2008 (CDT)

Revision as of 12:52, 15 June 2008

This article is developed but not approved.
Main Article
Discussion
Related Articles  [?]
Bibliography  [?]
External Links  [?]
Citable Version  [?]
 
To learn how to update the categories for this article, see here. To update categories, edit the metadata template.
 Definition The Gettysburg Campaign was a decisive defeat for the Confederacy in the American Civil War in June-July 1863; Gen. Robert E. Lee was the loser, Gen. George Meade of the Union Army the winner. [d] [e]
Checklist and Archives
 Workgroup categories Military and History [Categories OK]
 Subgroup category:  American Civil War
 Talk Archive none  English language variant American English

Puzzled as to why this is being renamed a campaign

While I disagreed with the convention of "Foo, Battle of", I fail to see how the Gettysburg Whatever can be considered a campaign rather than a battle. Neither side planned a major engagement at Gettysburg, which would take it into the level of operational art at which campaigns are fought.

The article speaks of a battle, lasting three days, but does not describe a specific operational-level objective that would make it a campaign, as were Vicksburg and Sherman's operations in Georgia. Technically, the Battle was a meeting engagement, with much tactical improvisation.

I believe this article would be more properly entitled "Battle of Gettysburg". Howard C. Berkowitz 11:09, 15 June 2008 (CDT)

Well, the battle did result from Lee's invasion of the North, which did have a grand strategic goal - to show that the North could not protect its citizens, and to help with international recognition (IIRC). So I think the whole thing (the march North, the consolidation of the Confederate army units at Gettysburg, etc) could be termed a 'campaign', but you're right, I wouldn't use that term for the three days of fighting there alone. (Although perhaps it's intended to eventually have I see the article does already cover the manoeuvering beforehand, too.) J. Noel Chiappa 11:14, 15 June 2008 (CDT)
The article is about a month-long campaign. I agree with Noel that the three days of July 1-3 are incomprehensible except in the context of a campaign, including Lee's strategy ahead of time and, especially, the failed followup on the part of Meade. Apart from Luvas, all the chief historians (Coddington, Brown, Nofi, Woodworth, McPherson, Wertz, ) avoid "battle" in their titles and prefer instead the Gettysburg Campaign and we are following their lead. See especially James M. McPherson, "To Conquer a Peace? Lee's Goals in the Gettysburg Campaign." Civil War Times 2007 46(2): 26-33.Richard Jensen 12:05, 15 June 2008 (CDT)
Aren't there two distinct issues here? And subjects? One is what the general layperson calls "The Battle of Gettysburg", by which he/she means the three-day battle. The other is the month-long "Gettysburg Campaign" to which Prof. Jensen refers. Why not do each?
  • And, by the way, here is what Larry has to say over the Forums about a pretty closely related subject:

    Even historians refer to battles as "Battle of X." There is no excuse to title our articles "X, Battle of." Ostensibly, the reason for titling any article in Richard's comma format is to make them easier to find in alphabetical listings. Putting aside the fact that we have finessed that problem with the 'abc' field in our metadata, there is no reason to think people will be more likely to look for an article about the Battle of X under X than under Battle. This is, of course, because the proper names of those battles whose names are in the form "Battle of X" are, in fact, in that form, of course. If anyone refers to them, as it were, on a "first name basis" as "Shiloh" or "Gettysburg" or "Waterloo," it is because it is obvious that they're talking about the battle. This does not entail (of course!!!) that, in titling an encyclopedia article, one can do without the words "battle of." So let's use "Battle of X," please. I also think it is implausible that people are not interested battles per se but only in the places where the battles occur. With a few exceptions, most places where famous battles have taken place are famous only because they are the sites of famous battles. Would nearly as many of us have heard of Pearl Harbor, Hastings, or Waterloo without battles being fought there? In short, there is absolutely no good reason, Richard notwithstanding, not to follow our standard CZ naming conventions in this case. Therefore, let's do so. Please do rename the relevant "battle" articles as appropriate; if anyone gives you grief about it, let me know, and please, don't expect me to do this because you're intimidated by Richard. I have too much to do myself. Just be bold!  :-) I'm giving you the right!

As an aside, it seems to me that this discussion has dragged out because Richard has taken a counterintuitive stance and then proceeded to defend it--and, in my humble opinion, weakly. I see that so far, he has persuaded no one (and several have made extremely strong points in reply). So, in this case, since the person taking the stand is one of our few active History Editors, and he seems to have made up his mind and wishes to establish his opinion as our policy, I guess it is incumbent upon me to declare that I am overruling him, as Editor-in-Chief. (Sorry, Richard.) Generally, I try to give editors the benefit of the doubt, but sometimes I do have to overrule them, which I assure you I never like to do. (End of Larry's quote -- It's hard to format this correctly.)
Hayford Peirce 12:30, 15 June 2008 (CDT)

Not daring to follow that number of colons without a colonoscope...

It would be perfectly appropriate to discuss, as a campaign, Lee's 1863 plans for the Army of Northern Virginia, but neither the lead nor the first section frames the activities in terms of a campaign. Clearly, Stuart failed if his mission were purely screening, which is a common perception. Lee and Stuart may have had an operational level plan for an independent cavalry operation, but these are not brought out. Presumably there would be other forces in a campaign, and, at a strategic level, perhaps pressure in other Confederate departments/theaters.

Some of Lee's thinking does come out in the "Operations" section, although "fantasy" does seem an apt description of Lee's ideas, which sound like a WWII Imperial Japanese Navy plan for a "decisive battle", at which all the barbarians' ships would conveniently sink. I had had the impression that Marse Robert was, if not a teetotaler, abstemious; those fantasies seem more appropriate for one indulging in psychoactive substances not readily available for a century. Given the Confederacy changed its cryptographic key only four times during the Late Unpleasantness Between the States (the term used by the docent at the Museum of the Confederacy in Richmond), the South did not seem overly obsessed with security. Was there no one in the CSA to observe that if that reflected Lee's thinking, a switch to Grant's brand of booze might be appropriate? I confess here that I have long thought of Lee as a good tactician, an inspirational leader, and a fine human being, but have never been impressed with his operational or strategic brilliance.

Seriously, if the article is to be about a campaign, the material in this section needs to move much nearer the beginning. I agree with Hayford that the average reader is going to be looking for the Three Days.

The maneuvering beforehand was not intended to force a decisive battle at Gettysburg, nor did "rebels, who had entered Gettysburg looking for a warehouse of shoes"--if "the Rebels" implied a major force. In reality, the only reason anything happened there was that a Confederate division commander, Henry Heth, heard that Gettysburg had a storehouse of much-needed shoes, and obtained permission to raid the town in search of those critical transportation resources.

Having spent 40 or so years in the DC area, "Army of Northern Virginia" sounds like massed irritated commuters in SUVs. Meade wouldn't have had a chance. :-) Howard C. Berkowitz 12:52, 15 June 2008 (CDT)