Taliban

From Citizendium
Revision as of 13:26, 8 May 2009 by imported>Howard C. Berkowitz (→‎Non-Taliban power blocs)
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Template:TOC-right The modern Taliban movement, or the Taleban Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (TIMA), took control of Afghanistan in 1994, imposing a strict Salafist rule, as or more conservative than the Wahhabi movement of Saudi Arabia. Both featured a "Department for Promoting Virtue and Preventing Vice." They argued they were creating a stable Islamic state that the leaders of the jihad against the Soviets could not create. [1]

At the present time, the modern Taliban forms a substantial part of the insurgency in the Afghanistan War (2001-), as well as an active insurgency in Pakistan. While the Taliban historically had a strong presence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas near the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. While they had made an interim peace agreement with Pakistan, fighting continued, and, on May 7, 2009, Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani of Pakistan formally revoked a peace agreement with the Taliban, accusing the Taliban of repeated violations. Taliban forces had fought to within 60 miles of Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. [2]

The modern Taliban movement unquestionably abrogated the human rights of citizens, especially women, and also provided sanctuary to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. They were ousted from power in the Afghanistan War (2001-), but continued to fight as guerrillas even after the formation of an interim Afghan government. The question remains open if having a Taliban faction in a new coalition would increase stability. Many also question if there are moderate Taliban elements that could and would participate in a government of national unity.

Tribal loyalties

The modern Taliban movement, rising in the chaos following the withdrawal of the Soviets in the Afghanistan War (1978-1992), connected a current Islamist trend with traditions of the Durrani Pashtun, whose traditional stronghold was Kandahar. President Hamid Karzai is a Durrani.

"Taliban" can be translated as "seeker" or "student" of Islam. The traditional Taliban go back at least two centuries in Afghan history, to Ahmad Shah Durrani, a king who died in 1773 and established an Islamic identity. The classic Taliban had been a "loose Islamic civil service", returning to villages as teachers and religious leaders.[3] They speak Pashtun, as opposed to Dari, the other major language of Afghanistan. [4]

Traditional opponents of the Durrani are the Galzai tribe, centered in Gardez, which has two branches: Ahmed Zai and Soloman Khail.[4]

Mullah Mohammed Omar, the symbol of the Taliban, belongs to the Galzai tribe, traditional enemies of the Durrani. Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani, who captured Khost province from the communist militia in 1991, hails from the Zadran tribe, which is a branch of the Soloman Khail. Similarly, most of the Taliban in Paktia hail from the Galzai or one of its branches. "

The rise of TIMA

The resurgent TIMA was made up principally of graduates of the Haqqania madrassa near Peshawar. That religious school's teachings drew from a 19th century Indian Muslim movement called Deobandism, which argued against modernization and believed that Muslims needed to live in the same way as the Prophet and his Companions. The Taliban both draw on their interpretation of Deoband Islam, but also a strong Pashtun concept of tradition and patriarchy, at odds with other tribes such as the Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbeks. [5]

Current Indian Deobands, however, do not preach holy war, but an Afghan and Pakistani branch does. "Everybody thinks of Islam as Arab, but you have to pay attention to Islam in South Asia," said Vali Nasr, a political scientist at the University of San Diego. "If you don't, you confront something like the Taliban and everyone says, 'Where did these guys come from?' To understand that, you have to understand Deoband." Current Deobandis say they teach"a socially conservative vision of Islam purified of folk and Hindu customs and concerned with teaching individuals how to practice their faith properly."[6]

Their Deobandī understanding of Islam is derived largely from the Jam῾īyatul ῾Ulamā῾-i Islām (JUI) movement in Pakistan, which had built hundreds of madrassas in Pakistan's Baluchistan province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. JUI had many factions, the most prominent of which was that led by Maulana Sami ul-Haq. [7]

Haqq's principal madrasah is the Darul Uloom Haqqania, which is located in Akora Khattak in the NWFP, Pakistan. Haqqania trained eight cabinet ministers of the previous Taliban regime. ḥaqq has also recruited Pakistani students from Haqqania to fight for the Taliban. During one Taliban military campaign in 1997, the entire student body was sent to join the militia. The Taliban 
has maintained ties with other militant Pakistani Islamist groups, including the Sipah-e Sahaba, a virulently anti-Shi'a organization, which joined the assault on Mazār-i Sharīf in 1998. [5]

Interviewed in 2007, ul-Haq did not speak of a traditional Taliban role in Afghanistan.

Well, the Taliban were busy in their studies when the factional wars in Afghanistan reached their climax. Naturally, when the leaders could not make it, the students had to come to the rescue of the war-torn country. Thus, the Taliban rushed back to rescue their country from the factional fighting. [i.e., after the Soviet withdrawal] Similarly, when America attacked Afghanistan in late 2001, the same event happened—it is understandable that when infidels attack a Muslim country, then it is the duty of every Muslim to defend it. Maulana Sufi Muhammad of Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat- e-Mohammadi (TNSM) also took thousands of people for jihad, which was a commendable action.[7]{

Taking control

Under Mullah Mohammad Omar, they advocated an Islamic revolution, under Sharia and without the foreign mujahedin. Most of their members were Pashtun that had fought the Soviets. Ma'soum Afghani said "Arabs fulfilled their role in Jihad in Afghanistan against Communism. We have relationships with some of them but not all of them are under our control or on our land. They live in Afghanistan as guests, but the land of Afghanistan will not be used against any other Islamic country."

In late 1994, Hashmat Ghani Azmadzai, leader of the Ahmadzai tribe, accepted what he considered a fair offer by the Taliban, to restore the king, hold a loya jirga (great council), and bring order to what was warlord anarchy. Supporting the Taliban, at this time, was seen as defending against enemies of the Pashtun. [8]So did the Karzai family, who were the descendants of Ahmad Shah Durrani.

Osama bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in May 1996.[9] According to Time', it was his $3 million contribution that gave the Taliban the margin of victory in September 1996.[10]

Another faction came from Amadzai's brother Ashraf, who has served as Finance Minister in the interim administration. Some Dari-speaking factions see him, and his Afghan Mellat party, as an authoritarian who wants to "Pashtunize" the other ethnic groups: Tajiks, Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmen, etc. See government evolution below. [11]

On 11 September 1996 the Taliban captured Jalalabad and Kabul on 27 September 1996, ousting the government. They captured former President Najibullah and his brother and killed them, hanging them from lamposts in the city center. As of the beginning of June 1997, the Taleian effectively controled two-thirds of the country.

Rule under the Taliban

There was a six-member ruling council in Kabul but ultimate authority for Taliban rule rested in the Taliban's inner Shura (Council), located in the southern city of Kandahar, and in Mullah Omar.

Taliban searched everywhere for acts practices they deemed inconsistent with the Qu'ran and Sunna. In an interview with Mullah Muhammad Hassan, "We cannot say this or that is permitted becasue it is allowed in Egypt or Saudi Arabia or Iran. We have studied many religious books and in all of them, the things we have prohibited are prohibited. So while we may say that what these countries do are their business, just as what we do is ours, we also say nothing they say or do allow them to escape from the basic fact: They are permitting things that are prohibited in Islam."[12] It is worth noting that only three countries, all Islamic, ever gave the Taliban diplomatic recognition: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); the UAE later withdrew it. [10]

On a personal basis, they required all men to grow beards of specified characteristics, and banned women from working outside the home, requiring them to wear the face and body cover of the chador. Gender restrictions interfered with the delivery of humanitarian and medical assistance to women and girls.

In October 1997 the Taliban changed the name of the country to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, with Mullah Muhammad Omar, who had previously assumed the religious title of Emir of the Faithful, as head of state.[13]

Civil war

The country was effectively partitioned between areas controlled by Pashtun and non-Pashtun forces, as the Taleban now controlled all the predominantly Pashtun areas of the country,as well as Herat and Kabul. Non-Pashtun, in general, formed the Northern Alliance opposing the Taliban. Massoud Sheikh Ahmed, military leader of the Northern Alliance, was Tajik. organizations controlled the areas bordering on the Central Asian republics whose populations are ethnically non-Pashtun, such as Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazara. In addition to ethnic conflict, the Hazara distrust the Taliban because they are Shi'a Muslims. [14]

The Taliban also receive support from Pakistan, especially Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, which tended, at the time, to contain some of the more extreme Islamist members of the Pakistani government. There was a confluence of interests among the Taliban, ISI, and bin Laden, all being anti-Soviet and strongly Islamic. ISI could also hide training, in Afghanistan, for missions in Kashmir. [15] This relationship caused distrust from Iran, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Russia. [16]

After the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Africa, Massoud wrote to the U.S. Senate, asking him to help against the Taliban, bin Laden, and ISI. The Clinton Administration, however, continued to focus on attempting to use diplomatic engagement with Mullah Omar, to get him to break with bin Laden. [17]

9-11, demands, and overthrow

Osama bin Laden had helped fund the Taliban take power, and turning him over to the West, in Mullah Omar's belief, would violate the tradition of protecting guests with no guarantees of western protection for his regime. According to a Time reporter, Omar said "Did we invite him in?" said Omar of bin Laden. "He was already here. But we don't know how to get rid of him or where to send him." Eventually, Omar decided to deny the recommendation of a 600-man body of senior clerics last Thursday to "encourage" bin Laden to leave Afghanistan "in his own free will" at a time and to a place of his choosing. Now, said the Taliban, Afghanistan is ready for a "showdown of might."[10]

Not all the foreign fighters in Afghanistan, on 9/11, were loyal to bin Laden, but to the Taliban idea a strict Islam through the Muslim world. According to Time, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates show there have been thousands of graduates from Afghan terrorist training camps, but only 3,000 are loyal to al-Qaeda. Still, Omar and bin Laden have intertwined interests and the Taliban is seen by the west as supporting al-Qaeda and in need of destruction.

Initial combat operations

Beginning on October 7, conventional combat operations against Afghanistan did not target the bulk of the Taliban, to encourage defections. The first stage was against critical command & control, air defense, and other direct barriers to Western operations. The second was against daylight raids carried out by jet fighters against ‘targets of opportunity’ such as military vehicles, and by bombers against defence emplacements, but not against troop concentrations. appeared to have been delayed in the hope that elements of the Taliban could be persuaded to defect. [18]

Ground drive against the Taliban

At the beginning of November the Pentagon moved to set the stage for a ground offensive by Alliance forces by intensifying bombing of Taliban and al-Qaeda ground forces on the frontlines around Mazar-e-Sharif and north of Kabul. Heavy bombing by AC-130 and B-52 bombers increased to 100 sorties per day in November, coupled with efforts to encourage defection. This would leave hard-core Taliban units unprotected when the Northern Alliane advance began. CIA Special Activities Division personnel preceded United States Army Special Forces teams that joined Northern Alliance units to advise and to guide in air strikes. GEN Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed that the US was supplying the Northern Alliance with munitions and facilitating the delivery of weapons supplied by other states, including Russia.

A U.S. Army Ranger unit raided an airfield near Kandahar, coded Objective Rhino, on the night of 19-20 October Rangers, while Special Operations Forces (SOF) soldiers attacked Taliban headquarters in Kandahar.[19] Later in November, a U.S. Marine ground unit would make Rhino its base for conventional attacks against Kandahar.

Military collapse

Four main factors contributed to the fairly sudden loss of Taliban control.

  1. Overdependence on local forces without strong loyalty
  2. Resentment of bin Laden's foreign fighters
  3. Attempting to defend all their territory
  4. Withdrawal of Pakistani support

The Taliban had become "highly dependent on manpower drawn from a variety of local militia and mujaheddin groups, which had tenuous loyalty to the Taliban. The extensive efforts made by anti-Taliban forces and US special forces to encourage defections from these groups proved beneficial once the Northern Alliance advance began, leaving core Taliban units exposed and unable to mount an effective defence.

"In the eyes of many Afghans, the foreign fighters linked to al-Qaeda are seen as the cause of many of their country’s ills. The decision to deploy al-Qaeda fighters and leaders to bolster ‘suspect’ Afghan Taliban units also served to increase resentment and create the impression that Afghan independence was under threat.

An apparent Taliban decision to "occupy all the territory under its control, rather than fall back to its core areas in the south and east." They committed to the northern front around Mazar-e-Sharif and Taloqan, rather than moving to more defensible line. To support this front, their supply lines went through Herat in anti-Pashtun areas. While the anti-Soviet mujaheddin had fought effective guerilla warfare, using their knowledge of the terrain to avoid contact, the Taliban put themselves into the reach of airpower. "Once the Northern Alliance had broken through the frontline, large numbers of men – including several thousand Pakistani and al-Qaeda fighters – were cut off in a pocket around Taloqan and Kunduz, resulting in the loss of a significant part of the Taliban’s combat strength.[20]

Pakistan hesitantly withdrew support, but, when it did, according to a Western diplomat interviewed by the New York Times, "We did not fully understand the significance of Pakistan's role in propping up the Taliban until their guys withdrew and things went to hell fast for the Talibs,"[21]

Fall of Kandahar

When the Taliban evacuated Kabul, they called for guerilla resistance, but still put on a static defense at Kandahar. Not only were they attacked there by the Northern Alliance and U.S. aircraft, as well as U.S. special operations forces operating from at least November 13, a U.S. Marine unit arrived on the ground on November 25. On 25 November US Marines, airlifted in from ships in the Arabian Sea, established a forward operating base at Dolangi airfield and began ground attacks.

On December 6, Northern Alliance leaders, including Karzai, met with Taliban leaders and negotiated a surrender of the city. Some Taliban put down their weapons, while others moved into guerilla warfare.

Government evolution

Former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who had been the Northern Alliance president ousted by the Taliban, said there have been talks with the Taliban. In May 2008, a Taliban response had changed slightly from earlier positions when they explicitly rejected the Karzai government; they simply did not mention it. [22]

In September 2008, Karzai asked for Saudi help in promoting talks with the Taliban. While he appealed to the Taliban, an anonymous former Taliban source told CBS News that they did not consider him a strong leader with whom they should negotiate. [23] While Hamed Karzai nominated him to succeed Kofi Annan as Secretary General of the United Nations, a post won by Ban-Ki Moon, the Mirror claims he is "fascistic" and unable to operate in a multipolar country. Cite error: Closing </ref> missing for <ref> tag There is an open issue, however, if the Taliban are monolithic.

While the Obama Administration has made Afghanistan the focus of new large-scale efforts against terrorism, John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, argues that the Taliban was a reluctantly provided a home al Qaeda in the 1990s, violated agreements to refrain from issuing inflammatory statements and fomenting violence abroad, and then, with the 9-11 attacks where the Taliban had no official role, brought down the Taliban government. "Given the Taliban’s limited interest in issues outside the "AfPak" region, if they came to power again now, they would be highly unlikely to host provocative terrorist groups whose actions could lead to another outside intervention."[24]

The Administration has suggested reaching out to "moderate Taliban." While Afghan President Hamid Karzai welcomed the idea, others were dubious.Some analysts suggest no such thing exists outside fantasy. "Obama's comment resemble a dream more than reality," "Where are the so-called moderate Taiban? Who are the moderate Taliban?" said Waheed Mozhdah, an official in both the Taliban and the Karzai governments.[22] A different Taliban said this could not work in the presence of a planned troop surge. Mullah Abdul Salem Zaeef, who spent nearly four years in Guantanamo Bay detention camp, said a mostly American surge

...was likely to act as a magnet to foreign fighters...All the people were optimistic when Obama became president. I was a little optimistic that he would stop the war, but when he declared the strategy, especially sending more troops and sending a military man as the ambassador, these strategies are war strategies, not a peace strategy and it's increasing the problem..."The Saudis wanted to be the interpreter between the Taliban and the government and they did something, but increasing more troops is destroying this process...The problem is not between Taliban and Afghans, everything is possible by Afghans. The Taliban are sitting with them, I know that, they respect each other." [25]

Not all opposition to the Karzai government are Taliban. Arsala Rahmani, a former Taliban, has met with both Taliban and non-Taliban opposition.[26]

Non-Taliban power blocs

In December 2008, there were negotiations between the government and Taliban that included other individuals with their own power base, such as former Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who has hundreds of his own fighters Eastern Afghanistan. Like Taliban leaders, there is a bounty on Hekmatyar, whose representatives met, in Dubai, with the government. Rahmani, a former Taliban minister and the current mediator between the Taliban and the government also said he was in contact with Mullah Jalaluddin Haqqani, who served as Chief of Army Staff as well as Minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs in Mullah Omar's government, as well as the Taliban military leader in southern Afghanistan.[26]

Haqqani, however, is also described as a leader of an active fighting opposition, and there is an American price for his capture. Xinhua describes him as "a close aide to Taliban chief Mullah Mohammad Omar and has been leading Taliban fighters in east Afghanistan". [27] Reuters said there were two raids against his forces in Khost Province [28]On September 8, U.S. armed drones fired missiles at a house and school he founded in Pakistan, killing 23, of whom several were his relatives. Reuters said he is "considered close to Osama bin Laden. The ailing Taliban commander was in Afghanistan along with his son Sirajuddin, who has been leading the group, at the time of the attack, another son said." A day later, a second raid captured weapons and detained two persons suspected of planting bombs.

Hostile Taliban leaders

At the head of the list of Taliban hardliners is Mullah Mohammed Omar, for whom the U.S. offers a USD $10 million reward. Others include his aide Mohammed Tayyib Agha and spokesman Qari Yusuf Ahmadi, Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, as well as former Taliban Justice Minister Mullah Nooruddin Turabi. Turabi directed the religious police.[26]

Other hostile opposition

Not all the Afghan leaders considered hostile are members of the Taliban, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, although they may cooperate with the movement.

Possible Taliban moderates

A western diplomat replied to Zaeef, that his claims of Taliban unity were "wishful thinking". He said: "There is plenty of empirical evidence that the insurgents are pulled in different directions and not all are prepared to drag the country into perpetual war."[25]

One suggested moderate is Maulavi Mohammad Qasim Halimi, Chief of Protocol under Mullah Omar, who was held in Bagram Prison for over a year, and who first met Halimi in 2001, before the collapse of the Talibani. In the Karzai government, he is chief of the investigation branch of the Supreme Court, and is a deputy to Afghan Chief Justice, Dr. Abdul Salam Azimi.

Halimi had given up wearing the black Pakul mujahedeen turban and had trimmed, but did not shave, his beard; he is freer to move than other former Taliban who work with the government. He also is in touch with other former Taliban, such as former Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Muttawakil and Abdul Salam Zaeef, former Taliban Ambassador to Afghanistan; they spent time in the same prisons. [26]

Several Taliban, with foreign experience, have been mentioned. They include the former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, who has spoken in terms of a national unity government. Other possibilities are former Taliban Foreign Minister Mullah Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil, and former Taliban envoy Sayed Rahmatullah Hashemi.

Hashemi, who had indeed tried to define the Taliban internationally, has spoken, in Western interviews. At the time, he defended the destruction of the Buddhas, although he has since said he personally regretted it. In 2006, he was a non-degree student at Yale. A professor of political science, Seyla Benhabib, said, in a telephone interview, he is not an ideological zealot. "How fortuitous it was that at the age of 18, because he knew languages," but worked as a translator, at various times, for the Taliban and UNICEF. [29]

Hashemi told Western interviewers said that he had faith in Western democracy, and believed in women's right to education and vote. "He pointed out that many Westerners have a misconception with regards to the Taliban movement, which some describe as a fundamentalist movement, yet there are those within it, such as former Foreign Minister Wakil Muttawakil who have moderate ideas, and who call for disarmament."[26]

References

  1. Ma'soum Afghani (April - May 1997), "The Spokesperson of the Taliban Government to Nida'ul Islam: "Our Goal is to Restore Peace and Establish a Pure and Clean Islamic State in Afghanistan"", Nida'ul Islam magazine
  2. "Prime minister: Pakistan fights for 'honor and dignity'", CNN, May 7, 2009
  3. Steve Coll (2004), Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, Penguin, pp. 280-283
  4. 4.0 4.1 Syed Saleem Shahzad (March 7, 2002), "Central Asia/Russia: Taliban draw strength from tribal roots", Asia Times
  5. 5.0 5.1 Emran Qureshi, "Taliban", The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World
  6. Celia W. Dugger (February 23, 2002), "Indian Town's Seed Grew Into the Taliban's Code", New York Times
  7. 7.0 7.1 Imtiaz Ali (May 23, 2007), "The Father of the Taliban: An Interview with Maulana Sami ul-Haq", Spotlight on Terror, Jamestown Foundation
  8. Coll, p. 285
  9. Coll, p. 11-12
  10. 10.0 10.1 10.2 Johanna McGeary (September 23, 2001), "The Taliban Troubles", Time
  11. "Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai: The Road to DisUnity of a Nation", Afghan Mirror
  12. Milton Viorst (2001), In the Shadow of the Prophet, Westview, ISBN 0813339022, p. 25
  13. "Taliban", Globalsecurity
  14. Ali A. Jalali, Lester W. Grau (March 1999), Whither the Taliban?, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS
  15. Arnie Schifferdecker (December 2001), The Taliban-Bin Laden-ISI Connection, American Foreign Service Association
  16. Ahmed Rashid (November/December, 1999), "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism", Foreign Affairs
  17. Coll. pp. 429-430
  18. Tim Youngs, Paul Bowers & Mark Oakes (December 11, 2001), The Campaign against International Terrorism: prospects after the fall of the Taliban, International Affairs and Defence Section, (U.K.) House of Commons Library, Research Paper 01/112, p. 10-11
  19. The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (October 2001-March 2003), Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, p. 14
  20. Youngs, Bowers & Oakes, pp. 14-15
  21. Douglas Frantz (December 8, 2001), A Nation Challenged: Supplying the Taliban; Pakistan Ended Aid to Taliban Only Hesitantly
  22. 22.0 22.1 Sayed Salahuddin (May 26, 2008), "Taliban vow to fight on, offer talks with Afghans", Reuters Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Reuters" defined multiple times with different content
  23. "Karzai Seeks Help Negotiating With Taliban; Afghan President Has Requested Help Of Saudi King In Thus-Far Fruitless Talks", CBS News, Sept. 30, 2008
  24. John Mueller (April 15, 2009), How Dangerous Are the Taliban? Why Afghanistan Is the Wrong War
  25. 25.0 25.1 Ben Farmer and Dean Nelson (April 5, 2009), "Moderate Taliban leader warns Barack Obama's plan will make Afghanistan worse", Guardian (U.K.)
  26. 26.0 26.1 26.2 26.3 26.4 Mohammed Al Shafey (January 4, 2009), "Who are the "Moderate Taliban"?", Asharq Al-Awsat
  27. "Coalition forces target Haqqani network in E Afghanistan", Xinhua Chinese News Agency, September 9, 2009
  28. "U.S. targets Haqqani network in Afghan east, 2 held", Reuters, September 9, 2009
  29. Alec Magnet (March 1, 2006), "Former Taliban Ambassador, a Yale Student, Provokes 'Consternation'", New York Sun