Metacognition: Difference between revisions
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Whenever one thinks about one’s occurrent thoughts about something — for example, wondering why one decides on one strategy to accomplish something as opposed to another, or wondering why one cannot recall the name of the person one just ran into — one performs an act of metacognition, in other words, having thoughts about one’s own thoughts or cognitions. One thus ‘metacognizes’ or ‘metathinks. Typically little realizing our doing it, we metacognize frequently. Neither of the principal two components of metacognition — monitoring and controlling one's thoughts — necessarily require conscious mental processing.<ref name=carey2002>Melanie Cary, Lynne M Reder. (2002) Metacognition in Strategy Selection: Giving Consciousness Too Much Credit.] Chapter 1. In: Patrick Chambres, Marie Izaute, Pierre-Jean Marescaux (editors).[http://books.google.com/books?id=Oe-p7eLy3YIC Metacognition: Process, Function, and Use.] Springer. ISBN 1402071345, ISBN 9781402071348. | Whenever one thinks about one’s occurrent thoughts about something — for example, wondering why one decides on one strategy to accomplish something as opposed to another, or wondering why one cannot recall the name of the person one just ran into — one performs an act of metacognition, in other words, having thoughts about one’s own thoughts or cognitions.<ref name=dunlosky2009>Dunlosky J, Metcalfe J. Metacognition. Sage:Los Angeles. ISBN 978-1-4129-3972-0.</ref> One thus ‘metacognizes’ or ‘metathinks. Typically little realizing our doing it, we metacognize frequently. Neither of the principal two components of metacognition — monitoring and controlling one's thoughts — necessarily require conscious mental processing.<ref name=carey2002>Melanie Cary, Lynne M Reder. (2002) Metacognition in Strategy Selection: Giving Consciousness Too Much Credit.] Chapter 1. In: Patrick Chambres, Marie Izaute, Pierre-Jean Marescaux (editors).[http://books.google.com/books?id=Oe-p7eLy3YIC Metacognition: Process, Function, and Use.] Springer. ISBN 1402071345, ISBN 9781402071348. | ||
*'''<u>Chapter Abstract:</u>''' Many researchers believe that mctacognitive processes regulate strategy selection. Another common assumption is that metacognitive processes, such as strategy selection, entail conscious processing or decision making. In this chapter, we examine whether conscious awareness is a critical aspect of strategy selection. We review evidence that first establishes that strategy selection varies both across and within individuals in response to dynamic features of the environment. Then, we present evidence that strategy adaptation can occur without (a) conscious consideration of different strategies or (b) conscious awareness of factors influencing one's strategy use. Specifically, shifts in strategy use occurred when people seemed to be unaware (a) that there were shifts in their strategy use or (b) that there were changes in the characteristics of the environment that, nonetheless, affected their strategy use..</ref> <ref name=reder96>Reder LM, Schum CD. (1996) [http://www.questia.com/read/102557298?title=Implicit%20Memory%20and%20Metacognition Chapter 3: “Metacognition Does Not Imply Awareness: Strategy Choice Is Governed by Implicit Learning and Memory.”] In: Reder LM (editor) ''Implicit Memory and Metacognition.'' Lawrence Erlbaum:Mahwah, NJ. | *'''<u>Chapter Abstract:</u>''' Many researchers believe that mctacognitive processes regulate strategy selection. Another common assumption is that metacognitive processes, such as strategy selection, entail conscious processing or decision making. In this chapter, we examine whether conscious awareness is a critical aspect of strategy selection. We review evidence that first establishes that strategy selection varies both across and within individuals in response to dynamic features of the environment. Then, we present evidence that strategy adaptation can occur without (a) conscious consideration of different strategies or (b) conscious awareness of factors influencing one's strategy use. Specifically, shifts in strategy use occurred when people seemed to be unaware (a) that there were shifts in their strategy use or (b) that there were changes in the characteristics of the environment that, nonetheless, affected their strategy use..</ref> <ref name=reder96>Reder LM, Schum CD. (1996) [http://www.questia.com/read/102557298?title=Implicit%20Memory%20and%20Metacognition Chapter 3: “Metacognition Does Not Imply Awareness: Strategy Choice Is Governed by Implicit Learning and Memory.”] In: Reder LM (editor) ''Implicit Memory and Metacognition.'' Lawrence Erlbaum:Mahwah, NJ. | ||
*'''<u>Excerpt:</u>''' ....there are two core meanings of the term metacognition to which most researchers using that label often refer: monitoring and control of cognitive processes....Monitoring of cognitive processes can include awareness of the component steps in cognitive processes as well as awareness of various features of these steps including their duration and their successfulness....Monitoring typically refers to awareness of the features of the current behavior....In contrast, control of cognitive processes refers to the processes that modify behavior, such as the selection of a strategy for performing a task....we focus on the relationship between monitoring and control of cognition in a special way: We argue that some aspects of metacognition typically called monitoring, and therefore implying awareness, actually operate without much awareness. Moreover, the control processes that operate to affect strategy choice are frequently influenced by implicit [non-conscious] processes.</ref> | *'''<u>Excerpt:</u>''' ....there are two core meanings of the term metacognition to which most researchers using that label often refer: monitoring and control of cognitive processes....Monitoring of cognitive processes can include awareness of the component steps in cognitive processes as well as awareness of various features of these steps including their duration and their successfulness....Monitoring typically refers to awareness of the features of the current behavior....In contrast, control of cognitive processes refers to the processes that modify behavior, such as the selection of a strategy for performing a task....we focus on the relationship between monitoring and control of cognition in a special way: We argue that some aspects of metacognition typically called monitoring, and therefore implying awareness, actually operate without much awareness. Moreover, the control processes that operate to affect strategy choice are frequently influenced by implicit [non-conscious] processes.</ref> | ||
Revision as of 23:31, 10 January 2009
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Note: Text in font-color Blue link to articles in Citizendium; text in font-color Light-Maroon link to articles not yet started; |
Whenever one thinks about one’s occurrent thoughts about something — for example, wondering why one decides on one strategy to accomplish something as opposed to another, or wondering why one cannot recall the name of the person one just ran into — one performs an act of metacognition, in other words, having thoughts about one’s own thoughts or cognitions.[1] One thus ‘metacognizes’ or ‘metathinks. Typically little realizing our doing it, we metacognize frequently. Neither of the principal two components of metacognition — monitoring and controlling one's thoughts — necessarily require conscious mental processing.[2] [3]
Metacognition does not subsume a unitary concept.
- One can metacognize about one’s knowledge or beliefs recalled from longterm memory, whether we remember correctly or incorrectly. One can think, “I needn’t exercise; I get enough just doing housework.”
- One can metacognize by monitoring one’s thinking, trying to decide, say, whether one has considered all factors relevant to the thought task at hand “Let’s see; what have I forgotten?”
- One can metacognize by controlling, or in some way, regulating one’s thinking: “I’m not going to pursue this line of thought, as it seems to lead nowhere, or I’m finding it depressing, or I’ll have to tell my confessor.”
- One may metacognize for purposes of strategizing future activities: “Okay, here’s my plan, but is it a good one.?”
- One can metacognize to try to determine why one has a certain world view: “Why do I think of myself as a slave; aren’t I as much a human being as my master?”
- One can metacognize during learning exercises: "Do I know the material, or do I need to study more?"
One can extend this list, which serves only to demonstrate that different categories of metcognition exist, and that the activity of metacognizing occurs as a natural cognitive phenomenon, considered by some scholars a conscious phenomenon, but not necessarily according to others.<cary2002/> <reder96/>
Metacognition qualifies as an academic discipline, a subdiscipline of Cognitive Science. In conjunction with this article under development, the reader might consult....
References and notes cited in text
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Most citations to articles listed here include links — in font-color blue — to full-text. Accessing full-text may require personal or institutional subscription. Nevertheless, many with do offer full-text, and if not, usually offer text or links that show the abstracts of the articles, free without subscription. Links to books variously may open to full-text, or to the publishers' description of the book with or without downloadable selected chapters, reviews, and table of contents. Books with links to Google Books often offer extensive previews of the books' text. |
- ↑ Dunlosky J, Metcalfe J. Metacognition. Sage:Los Angeles. ISBN 978-1-4129-3972-0.
- ↑ Melanie Cary, Lynne M Reder. (2002) Metacognition in Strategy Selection: Giving Consciousness Too Much Credit.] Chapter 1. In: Patrick Chambres, Marie Izaute, Pierre-Jean Marescaux (editors).Metacognition: Process, Function, and Use. Springer. ISBN 1402071345, ISBN 9781402071348.
- Chapter Abstract: Many researchers believe that mctacognitive processes regulate strategy selection. Another common assumption is that metacognitive processes, such as strategy selection, entail conscious processing or decision making. In this chapter, we examine whether conscious awareness is a critical aspect of strategy selection. We review evidence that first establishes that strategy selection varies both across and within individuals in response to dynamic features of the environment. Then, we present evidence that strategy adaptation can occur without (a) conscious consideration of different strategies or (b) conscious awareness of factors influencing one's strategy use. Specifically, shifts in strategy use occurred when people seemed to be unaware (a) that there were shifts in their strategy use or (b) that there were changes in the characteristics of the environment that, nonetheless, affected their strategy use..
- ↑ Reder LM, Schum CD. (1996) Chapter 3: “Metacognition Does Not Imply Awareness: Strategy Choice Is Governed by Implicit Learning and Memory.” In: Reder LM (editor) Implicit Memory and Metacognition. Lawrence Erlbaum:Mahwah, NJ.
- Excerpt: ....there are two core meanings of the term metacognition to which most researchers using that label often refer: monitoring and control of cognitive processes....Monitoring of cognitive processes can include awareness of the component steps in cognitive processes as well as awareness of various features of these steps including their duration and their successfulness....Monitoring typically refers to awareness of the features of the current behavior....In contrast, control of cognitive processes refers to the processes that modify behavior, such as the selection of a strategy for performing a task....we focus on the relationship between monitoring and control of cognition in a special way: We argue that some aspects of metacognition typically called monitoring, and therefore implying awareness, actually operate without much awareness. Moreover, the control processes that operate to affect strategy choice are frequently influenced by implicit [non-conscious] processes.