Seizo Arisue: Difference between revisions

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'''Arisue Seizo''' (1895 – 1992)  was a [[lieutenant general]] in the [[Imperial Japanese Army]] who headed its intelligence department in 1945, and was part of U.S. anticommunist activities after the war. He was considered as a possible war criminal, but was not indicted, possibly due to his support of [[U.S. intelligence involvement with World War II Japanese war criminals|U.S. postwar programs]].
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'''Seizo Arisue ''' (1895–1992)  was a [[lieutenant general]] in the [[Imperial Japanese Army]] who headed its intelligence department in 1945, and was part of U.S. anticommunist activities after the war. He was considered as a possible war criminal, but was not indicted, possibly due to his support of [[U.S. intelligence involvement with World War II Japanese war criminals|U.S. postwar programs]].
==WWII==
==WWII==
*[[Military attache]] to Italy, 1939
*[[Military attache]] to Italy, 1939
Line 6: Line 8:
*Vice Chief of Staff Northern China Area Army, 1941
*Vice Chief of Staff Northern China Area Army, 1941
*Imperial General Headquarters, 1942-1945
*Imperial General Headquarters, 1942-1945
*Intelligence department head, 1945
*Intelligence department head, 1945  
 
Shortly before the end of the war, Arisue began collecting intelligence documents to use as a bargaining chip with the Occupation. <ref name=Petersen2006> {{citation
| chapter = Chapter 8: The Intelligence that Wasn't: CIA Name Files, the U.S. Army, and Intelligence Gathering in Occupied Japan
| first = Michael | last =  Petersen
| year = 2006
| url = http://www.aiipowmia.com/reports/unit731essays.pdf
| publisher =  National Archives and Records Administration Interagency Working Group (IWG)
| title = Researching Japanese War Crimes Records
}}</ref>
 
==Surrender==
He was one of the senior officers that received the first occupation aircraft at Atsugi Air Base. <ref>{{citation
| url = http://www.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~knagai/GHQFILM/DOCUMENTS/macreport2.html
| title = Reports of General MacArthur
| volume = Volume 2
| publisher = Government Printing Office}}</ref>
==Postwar==
==Postwar==
The key individual in the "undergrounds" was [[Lieutenant General]] , chief of the intelligence department at Imperial General Headquarters at the end of the war. Shortly before the end of the war, Arisue began collecting intelligence documents to use as a bargaining chip with the Occupation.  
General [[Charles Willoughby]], [[Douglas MacArthur]]'s chief of intelligence (G-2), asked Arisue, in September 1945, to set up a domestic intelligence network to warn of a potential Communist coup. Ironically, Willoughby was unaware that Arisue and some of his associates, at various times, considered right-wing coups against the Japanese government.
 
In MacArthur's headquarters, sentiment  toward Arisue was mixed, and officers outside G-2 considered indicting Arisue as a Class A war criminal.  Willoughby, however, had met and liked  [[Lieutenant General]] [[Kawabe Torashiro]] who had been head of intelligence for the [[Kwangtung Army]], military attaché to Berlin, deputy chief of staff for Imperial GHQ, and the leader of the surrender delegation to Manila.  


SCAP sentiment toward Arisue was mixed, and officers outside G-2 considered indicting Arisue as a Class A war criminal.  Willoughby, however, had met and liked  [[Lieutenant General]] [[Kawabe Torashiro]] who had been head of intelligence for the [[Kwantung Army]], military attaché to Berlin, deputy chief of staff for Imperial GHQ, and the leader of the surrender delegation to Manila. 


Willoughby asked Arisue, in September 1945, to set up a domestic intelligence network to warn of a potential Communist coup. Ironically, Willoughby was unaware that Arisue and some of his associates, at various times, considered right-wing coups against the Japanese government.
==References==
{{reflist|2}}

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Seizo Arisue (1895–1992) was a lieutenant general in the Imperial Japanese Army who headed its intelligence department in 1945, and was part of U.S. anticommunist activities after the war. He was considered as a possible war criminal, but was not indicted, possibly due to his support of U.S. postwar programs.

WWII

  • Military attache to Italy, 1939
  • Chief of Military Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau, Ministry of War,1939-1941
  • Chief of 4th Section, Northern China Area Army, 1941
  • Vice Chief of Staff Northern China Area Army, 1941
  • Imperial General Headquarters, 1942-1945
  • Intelligence department head, 1945

Shortly before the end of the war, Arisue began collecting intelligence documents to use as a bargaining chip with the Occupation. [1]

Surrender

He was one of the senior officers that received the first occupation aircraft at Atsugi Air Base. [2]

Postwar

General Charles Willoughby, Douglas MacArthur's chief of intelligence (G-2), asked Arisue, in September 1945, to set up a domestic intelligence network to warn of a potential Communist coup. Ironically, Willoughby was unaware that Arisue and some of his associates, at various times, considered right-wing coups against the Japanese government.

In MacArthur's headquarters, sentiment toward Arisue was mixed, and officers outside G-2 considered indicting Arisue as a Class A war criminal. Willoughby, however, had met and liked Lieutenant General Kawabe Torashiro who had been head of intelligence for the Kwangtung Army, military attaché to Berlin, deputy chief of staff for Imperial GHQ, and the leader of the surrender delegation to Manila.


References

  1. Petersen, Michael (2006), Chapter 8: The Intelligence that Wasn't: CIA Name Files, the U.S. Army, and Intelligence Gathering in Occupied Japan, Researching Japanese War Crimes Records, National Archives and Records Administration Interagency Working Group (IWG)
  2. Reports of General MacArthur, vol. Volume 2, Government Printing Office