Tactical Mobility Requirements Board
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The U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, or "Howze Board" under then-LTG Hamilton H. Howze, was chartered by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who directed the Army "examine aviation in a new light and be more audacious in using it."explore new concepts in ground mobility. [1] In current Training and Doctrine Command concepts, this was to be an evaluation of the air assault concept using the DTLOMS paradigm: doctrine, training, leadership, organization, material, and soldier systems. Air assault met those requirements and established itself as a revolutionary, not evolutionary, change in ground combat. McNamara's initiative was not popular with many senior United States Air Force officers, whose concept of ground mobility involved paratroopers flown in Air Force transports. The Airmobile concept, in some Air Force thinking, was breaking out of the Army role defined in the 1948 Key West Agreement. Meanwhile, the Army, to some extent, finessed the Air Force by initial cooperation with the United States Marine Corps, which was not bound by the Army restrictions from Key West. Exceptions to the Key West AgreementThe early Army-Marine cooperation conceived the OV-1 Mohawk, which really did not meet the Marine-specific requirement, which left the program under Army jurisdiction. "Because the Mohawk was an exception to the Secretary of Defense's memorandum on weight limitations for Army aircraft and because it had inherent capabilities for armament, the Air Force had opposed its development from the beginning. There is no doubt that certain Army extremists viewed the Mohawk as the "nose of the camel within the tent of tactical air support." The Caribou, a 32-passenger short-takeoff aircraft, with the cargo capacity of a C-47, also had a waiver from the Key West Agreement, and did well in Vietnam although in 1966, however, it was transferred to the Air Force. In December 1960, when the Mohawk and Caribou were presented to Generals Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), along with Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), George H. Decker, the CSAF observed,
Howze Board recommendationThe Howze Board findings of August 1962 recommended the formation and testing of an air assault division, an air cavalry combat brigade and an air transport brigade; only the first two were implemented. Tolson observed,
Air assault divisionThis unit would have four times the aircraft and one-third the number of vehicles in a standard infantry devision. Due to the reduction in vehicles and the deletion of medium and heavy artillery, the higher-technology airborne division cost less. It was organized into three brigades, and had enough transport helicopters to lift one brigade equivalent at a time. For fire support, it would have only light howitzers that could be carried by the CH-47 Chinook, MGR-3 Little John 320mm heavy rockets capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, plus armed Mohawks and UH-1 "Hueys" for direct support. Air Cavalry brigade"The Board also recommended the organization of an air cavalry combat brigade having 316 aircraft, 144 of which would be attack helicopters. Its function was the classical one for cavalry-to screen, reconnoiter, and wage delaying actions. Unlike the air assault division which was designed to join battle on the ground, all of the air cavalry combat brigade was to be airborne including its anti-tank capacity. " AIR ASSAULT II: the testTo test division-level operations, the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) was activated for field exercises. The culmination of the tests was an exercise called AIR ASSAULT II, pitting the airmobile division against the 82nd Airborne Division, the latter a paratroop division moved by Air Force transports and having close air support from Air Force combat aircraft. [2] AIR ASSAULT II's test director -- referee in civilian terms -- was MG Charles W.G. Rich Rich. It literally began in a hurricane, with the ruling that wars rarely were called for rain. Afterwards, the commanders and directors commented:
MG Rich, while observing there was much to be learned, recommended the development of an Army air assault division. His informal summary is informative: "I wish to distinguish between three fundamental levels of airmobility:
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